金融文章中英文對(duì)照
在現(xiàn)代市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中，金融的地位越來(lái)越突出，起著很重要的作用。下面是學(xué)習(xí)啦小編為大家?guī)?lái)了中英文對(duì)照的金融文章，歡迎大海閱讀!
金融文章中英文對(duì)照篇1
金融時(shí)報(bào)雙語(yǔ)閱讀
China should let its currency rise. Such has been the desperate, decade-long complaint from the US and its politicians. China’s manipulation of its currency is a popular scapegoat both for the financial crisis and for the extinction of US manufacturing.
An appreciation is plainly in China’s urgent interests. And the rest of the world, including the US, is beginning to grasp that it has reason to fear the consequences if it does. On Wednesday and Thursday of this week, China’s authorities at one point allowed the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar by a greater percentage than in any two-day period since its managed rise first started in 2005. These moves remain tiny; but they combine with official criticism of the US, a growing need to combat Chinese inflation and much Chinese commentary favouring a change of policy to suggest that the renminbi may soon be allowed to take flight. A widening of its trading bands might be a first incremental step.
Unlike the first managed appreciation, from 2005 to 2008, the current “appreciation” has done nothing to help domestic inflation. By tying to the dollar, a currency sinking like a stone, the renminbi has depreciated against all currencies on a trade-weighted basis, JPMorgan data show. A drastic shift is needed. That will mean exporting its inflation. It also means buying fewer treasuries, or even selling some, which would in turn counteract any efforts at “quantitative easing” – buying bonds to keep US yields low.
The dollar would probably tumble, and treasury yields rise. Other effects are less clear. The Australian dollar, long a proxy for Chinese growth, might suffer if China slows, as might other commodity-driven currencies but much depends on China’s own decisions.
China’s external reserves are enough, even at current prices, to buy all the gold ever produced. It will be hard to shift policy without causing a big displacement elsewhere in the world. Correcting this global imbalance may be necessary but it will not be easy.
Lex專欄：美國(guó)擔(dān)心人民幣升值?
中國(guó)應(yīng)該讓人民幣升值——美國(guó)及其政界人士為此聲嘶力竭地抱怨了10年。從金融危機(jī)到美國(guó)制造業(yè)的衰亡，“中國(guó)操縱人民幣匯率”都是熱門的替罪羊。
人民幣升值顯然符合中國(guó)的利益。而包括美國(guó)在內(nèi)的世界其它國(guó)家正開始意識(shí)到，它們有理由擔(dān)心人民幣升值的后果。本周三和周四，中國(guó)官方一度允許人民幣兌美元匯率以較大幅度上漲，漲幅超過2005年中國(guó)啟動(dòng)匯改以來(lái)任何一個(gè)兩天期間。這些升值步伐仍是微小的;但它們與中國(guó)官方對(duì)美國(guó)的批評(píng)、中國(guó)日需迫切需要遏制通脹、以及中國(guó)近期出現(xiàn)的大量支持改變政策的言論相結(jié)合，似乎表明人民幣不久可能獲準(zhǔn)大幅走高。擴(kuò)大其交易區(qū)間也許是第一個(gè)漸進(jìn)步驟。
與2005年至2008年第一輪有管理的升值不同，當(dāng)前這一輪“升值”迄今無(wú)助于遏制國(guó)內(nèi)通脹。摩根大通(JPMorgan)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，與幣值直線下跌的美元掛鉤意味著，人民幣在貿(mào)易加權(quán)基礎(chǔ)上兌所有貨幣都貶值了。中國(guó)需要大幅度地轉(zhuǎn)變做法。那將意味著輸入中國(guó)的通脹。那還將意味著減少購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債，甚至減持美國(guó)國(guó)債，從而抵消“定量寬松”(美國(guó)政府買入國(guó)債以壓低其收益率)的努力。
美元很可能大幅走低，美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率很可能上升。其它效應(yīng)則不那么明確。澳大利亞元長(zhǎng)期是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)指標(biāo)，如果中國(guó)增長(zhǎng)放緩，澳元以及由大宗商品推動(dòng)的其它一些貨幣可能走低，但很多事取決于中國(guó)自己的決策。
即便按當(dāng)前價(jià)格計(jì)算，中國(guó)的外匯儲(chǔ)備也足夠買下人類有史以來(lái)開采的全部黃金。要轉(zhuǎn)變政策而不致對(duì)世界其它地方產(chǎn)生重大沖擊，是很難的。糾正這種全球失衡也許是必要的，但它不會(huì)是一件易事。
金融文章中英文對(duì)照篇2
A precipitate, wrong and dangerous decision
The downgrade by Standard & Poor’s of US sovereign debt, from triple A to double A plus, was precipitate, wrong and dangerous.
At best, S&P showed a stunning ignorance and disregard for the potential consequences on a fragile global financial system. The rating agency chose to take this action after the worst week in US equity markets since 2008, a week which not only saw stocks fall sharply, but which also witnessed a dangerous escalation in the European debt crisis. The action was wholly unnecessary and the timing could not have been worse. Compounding this, the reasoning was poor and consequences, both short and long term, for the global financial system unpredictable.
It is unacceptable that privately owned, for-profit companies should have special, legally sanctioned status at the heart of the financial system to function as quasi-regulatory authorities whose opinions can determine what securities financial institutions can hold, how much capital they need, what the borrowing costs of every member of the system will be, all based on secret deliberations with no accountability.
The disastrously flawed ratings of these agencies were at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis and S&P’s action threatens to cause mayhem again by creating uncertainty about the ability of the US to function in its critical role in the financial system.
There was no need for S&P to rush to judgment just days after a bruising political battle had secured a bipartisan agreement to raise the debt ceiling through the next election cycle and which initiated a process to begin to cut spending and address the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalances. Neither Fitch nor Moody’s saw any need to do so, indeed, Moody’s indicated that it saw the agreement as “a turning point in fiscal policy” and declared that a downgrade would be “premature”.
The decision is also wrong. First, it is incredible that S&P should think the US is less creditworthy now than two weeks ago, when an agreement to raise the debt ceiling had not been reached, both parties appeared intransigent and contingency plans were being considered that included prioritising payments or even declaring the debt ceiling null and void. In any event, an agreement was reached that assures the ability of the US to fund its operations through the next election and initiated a process to tackle the nation’s long-standing fiscal imbalances.
The debate on the debt ceiling, moreover, concentrated public attention on the deep fiscal imbalances in the US and changed the governing priorities to include steps to address the unsustainable trajectory of government spending. Now the debate is centred on whether revenue enhancement is needed. This is progress and should have counted for, not against, the triple A rating.
Second, S&P apparently gave little or no weight to the unique role the US plays in the global economy. The US is the world’s largest, most productive economy and the dollar remains the global reserve currency. The only possible alternative, the euro, is structurally flawed and is in what may turn out to be an existential crisis. Issuing its own currency means the US can settle its debts by printing more money if need be, so there is absolutely no question of its ability to pay. Third, the market says S&P is wrong. The US enjoys among the lowest interest rates in its history coincident with the highest deficits and a daunting long-term fiscal outlook. Yet when investors are looking for safe assets, they buy Treasuries. The US is borrowing at lower long-term rates than it did when it was running a budget surplus. In the 2008 crisis, investors flocked to Treasuries and the dollar because they sought the safest, most creditworthy assets in the world. S&P seems not to have noticed this.
The agency’s actions pose unpredictable and dangerous risks to the global economy. As Warren Buffett has noted, fear is contagious and spreads quickly; confidence is fragile and only returns gradually and over time. S&P’s actions can only undermine weak confidence and raise uncertainty. It has created what Keynes called irreducible uncertainty. We have no idea of the consequences of S&P deciding the risk-free assets issued by the country that occupies a unique place in the global economy may not be risk free after all.
One consequence we can all hope for is that Congress ends the oligopoly of Nationally Recognised Statistical Ratings Organisations before they contribute to or ignite another financial crisis. Even S&P agrees, stating to its credit that the regulatory reliance on ratings by NRSROs should end. By all means, let’s have S&P, Moody's and Fitch opine about creditworthiness. But let’s have them do it in a free competitive market and not via a legally-sanctioned oligopoly which effectively regulates without oversight or consequence.
Bill Miller is chief investment officer of Legg Mason Capital Management.
標(biāo)普犯下大錯(cuò)
標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾(Standard & Poor’s)將美國(guó)主權(quán)債務(wù)評(píng)級(jí)從AAA下調(diào)至AA+，是一個(gè)草率、錯(cuò)誤而又危險(xiǎn)的舉動(dòng)。
說(shuō)的輕一點(diǎn)，對(duì)于此舉可能給脆弱的全球金融體系造成的后果，標(biāo)普表現(xiàn)出了驚人的無(wú)知與漠視。這家評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)所選擇的時(shí)機(jī)，是在美國(guó)股市經(jīng)歷了自2008年以來(lái)最糟糕的一周之后。那一周，不僅股市大跌，而且歐洲債務(wù)危機(jī)也出現(xiàn)了危險(xiǎn)的升級(jí)。標(biāo)普此舉完全不必要，時(shí)機(jī)的選擇也糟糕透頂。更可怕的是，其推理拙劣，而給全球金融體系所造成的結(jié)果(無(wú)論短期還是長(zhǎng)期)是難以預(yù)測(cè)的。
以盈利為目的的私有公司卻擁有法律認(rèn)可的特殊地位，即處于金融體系的核心、發(fā)揮準(zhǔn)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的職能，這令人無(wú)法接受。這些準(zhǔn)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)權(quán)勢(shì)熏天，他們的意見可以決定金融機(jī)構(gòu)可持有何種證券、需要多少資本金、金融體系中的每個(gè)成員的借款成本應(yīng)該是多少，而且所有這些依據(jù)的都是一些隱秘的考量，無(wú)需加以解釋說(shuō)明。
這些機(jī)構(gòu)給出的具有災(zāi)難性缺陷的評(píng)級(jí)，正是2008年金融危機(jī)的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?，而?biāo)普這次的行為有可能會(huì)再次引發(fā)混亂，因?yàn)樗o美國(guó)扮演全球金融體系關(guān)鍵角色的能力帶來(lái)了不確定性。
標(biāo)普根本沒有必要在這個(gè)時(shí)候匆忙做出判斷。僅僅數(shù)日之前，一場(chǎng)激烈的政治斗爭(zhēng)剛剛推動(dòng)兩黨達(dá)成了一項(xiàng)在下個(gè)選舉周期內(nèi)提高債務(wù)上限的協(xié)議，并開啟了著手削減支出、解決美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期財(cái)政失衡的進(jìn)程。惠譽(yù)(Fitch)和穆迪(Moody’s)都沒有看出采取這種做法的任何必要，事實(shí)上，穆迪已表示，它認(rèn)為上述協(xié)議是“財(cái)政政策的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)”，并宣稱目前調(diào)降評(píng)級(jí)將“為時(shí)過早”。
標(biāo)普的決定也是錯(cuò)誤的。首先，標(biāo)普認(rèn)為眼下的美國(guó)比兩周前信譽(yù)度低，這令人難以置信。兩周前，提高債務(wù)上限的協(xié)議尚未達(dá)成，民主與共和兩黨看上去都沒有妥協(xié)的意愿，有關(guān)優(yōu)先支付哪些款項(xiàng)、甚至宣布債務(wù)上限無(wú)效的應(yīng)急方案已在考慮之中。不管怎么說(shuō)，兩黨目前已達(dá)成了一項(xiàng)協(xié)議，這確保了美國(guó)在下個(gè)選舉周期內(nèi)為其運(yùn)行融資的能力，并開啟了解決該國(guó)由來(lái)已久的財(cái)政失衡的進(jìn)程。
此外，圍繞債務(wù)上限的論戰(zhàn)，將公眾注意力集中到了美國(guó)的嚴(yán)重財(cái)政失衡上，改變了政府的優(yōu)先事務(wù)排序，納入了解決不可持續(xù)的政府支出模式的步驟。如今，論戰(zhàn)主要集中到了是否需要增加收入這個(gè)問題上。這是一個(gè)進(jìn)步，應(yīng)該被認(rèn)為是對(duì)AAA評(píng)級(jí)有利、而非有害的因素。
第二，標(biāo)普顯然幾乎(或壓根)沒有考慮美國(guó)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中獨(dú)一無(wú)二的地位。美國(guó)是全球規(guī)模最大、生產(chǎn)力最高的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，美元仍然是全球儲(chǔ)備貨幣。唯一可能的替代品歐元在結(jié)構(gòu)上存在缺陷，而且正處于一場(chǎng)最終可能關(guān)系到其能否存在的危機(jī)之中。發(fā)行自己的貨幣，意味著如果有必要，美國(guó)可以通過印刷更多的貨幣來(lái)解決自己的債務(wù)，所以它的支付能力絕對(duì)不存在任何問題。
第三，市場(chǎng)也認(rèn)為標(biāo)普的決定是錯(cuò)誤的。目前，美國(guó)的利率水平處在歷史最低位，而赤字卻處于最高水平，長(zhǎng)期財(cái)政前景不容樂觀。然而，當(dāng)投資者想要購(gòu)買安全資產(chǎn)時(shí)，他們還是會(huì)選擇美國(guó)國(guó)債。美國(guó)目前的長(zhǎng)期借債利率低于預(yù)算盈余時(shí)期的利率水平。2008年金融危機(jī)期間，投資者紛紛搶購(gòu)美國(guó)國(guó)債和美元資產(chǎn)，因?yàn)樗麄儗ふ业木褪侨蜃畎踩?、最可靠的資產(chǎn)。而標(biāo)普似乎沒有注意到這一點(diǎn)。
標(biāo)普的行為對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成了不可預(yù)測(cè)的極大威脅。沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)曾說(shuō)過，恐懼是會(huì)傳染的，而且蔓延速度很快;而信心則十分脆弱，只能逐步、緩慢地恢復(fù)。標(biāo)普的行為只會(huì)損害市場(chǎng)本已脆弱的信心，并增加不確定性。這已經(jīng)造成了凱恩斯所說(shuō)的“不可減少的不確定性”。標(biāo)普判定，由在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中占據(jù)獨(dú)一無(wú)二地位的美國(guó)所發(fā)行的無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)，可能并不是真的沒有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。對(duì)于這樣一個(gè)決定會(huì)帶來(lái)哪些后果，我們?nèi)圆坏枚?/p>
我們都希望看到的一個(gè)結(jié)果是，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)能夠在那幾家“全國(guó)認(rèn)定的評(píng)級(jí)組織”(Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization)促成或引發(fā)下一場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)之前，終結(jié)它們的寡頭壟斷。甚至連標(biāo)普也同意這一點(diǎn)——該公司值得贊許地表示，監(jiān)管部門應(yīng)該結(jié)束對(duì)這些機(jī)構(gòu)評(píng)級(jí)的依賴。當(dāng)然，我們應(yīng)該讓標(biāo)普、穆迪(Moody's)和惠譽(yù)(Fitch)繼續(xù)就信譽(yù)發(fā)表意見。但應(yīng)該讓它們?cè)谝粋€(gè)自由競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)發(fā)表意見，而不是憑借獲得法律認(rèn)可、實(shí)際上不受監(jiān)督或不計(jì)后果的寡頭壟斷地位。
金融文章中英文對(duì)照篇3
Banks often regard securitization as a balance sheet transformation tool. Traditionally mortgages are a bank's largest asset and also the least liquid. Securitization involves packaging similar assets such as mortgages and selling them to a trustee, either through the establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or corporate entity. Bonds are then issued (backed by the assets) by this corporate entity and sold to investors. This is done to generate additional funds for the bank and to manage the structure of the balance sheet. These additional funds can then be used for further lending, acquisitions, stock repurchases, etc.
銀行通常將資產(chǎn)證券化視為資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表轉(zhuǎn)換工具。從傳統(tǒng)上看，貸款抵押是銀行的最大資產(chǎn)，也最不算是流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)了。資產(chǎn)證券化就是通過成立一個(gè)特設(shè)載體(SPV)或公司實(shí)體來(lái)對(duì)類似資產(chǎn)比如抵押進(jìn)行包裝，然后將其賣給某一托管人。然后公司實(shí)體會(huì)發(fā)行資產(chǎn)抵押債券，并賣給投資者。這樣做是為了替銀行生成額外資金并對(duì)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行管理。然后這些額外資金被用于進(jìn)一步的貸款、收購(gòu)、股票回購(gòu)等等。
金融文章中英文對(duì)照篇4
The financial marke 0
The financial markets in China are still in their infancy, with many areas that do not have the legal framework required to begin operations. A financial market is a market created for the exchange of capital and debt. It includes the capital, money and stock markets. Financial markets have been developing throughout the world for hundreds of years and the pace of change brings new challenges for all participants. In many foreign countries, the financial markets have been focusing on regulation, risk management, customer service, improvement of efficiency, transparency, cost cutting, etc. It is safe to say, that the banks in China have made continuous developments in each of these areas.
中國(guó)的金融市場(chǎng)仍處于初期階段，許多地區(qū)沒有必要的法律體制就開始運(yùn)作。金融市場(chǎng)是為資金和貸款交易而設(shè)立的市場(chǎng)。它包括資金、貨幣和股票市場(chǎng)。金融市場(chǎng)在全球已經(jīng)發(fā)展了數(shù)百年，其變化的速度之快給所有參與者帶來(lái)了新的挑戰(zhàn)。在國(guó)外許多國(guó)家，金融市場(chǎng)主要將重點(diǎn)放在調(diào)整、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、消費(fèi)者服務(wù)、提高效率、透明度、成本削減等方面?？梢钥隙ǖ卣f(shuō)，中國(guó)銀行在這些領(lǐng)域取得了持續(xù)的發(fā)展。
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