地方政府在債務(wù)方面也有自己的擔(dān)憂(yōu)。中國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)署(National Audit Office)去年公布的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，地方政府的負(fù)債額約為1.65萬(wàn)億美元，而其他人則認(rèn)為，實(shí)際負(fù)債額可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于這個(gè)數(shù)字。

　　So would bond investors lending to SMEs, and in turn local governments, be throwing good money after bad? That depends on your view of China’s debt chain. Local governments largely owe money to big state-backed banks, which in turn are tools of the central government.

　　如此說(shuō)來(lái)，債券投資者借錢(qián)給中小企業(yè)、進(jìn)而借錢(qián)給地方政府，這是在沒(méi)完沒(méi)了地把錢(qián)往水里扔嗎?這要取決于你如何看待中國(guó)的債務(wù)鏈。地方政府的主要債權(quán)人是大型國(guó)有銀行，而國(guó)有銀行又是中央政府的政策工具。

　　Many economists believe China’s banks will need some kind of recapitalisation as bad debts surface and non-performing loans rise. If managed correctly, that needn’t be a cause for alarm. At the moment, things don’t look too troubling. NPL ratios are low, and indeed falling.

　　許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都認(rèn)為，隨著壞賬浮出水面以及不良貸款的增加，中國(guó)的銀行需要進(jìn)行某種形式的資本重組。如果處理得當(dāng)，這無(wú)需成為拉響警報(bào)的理由。當(dāng)前，情況看上去并沒(méi)有那么糟糕。不良貸款率較低，實(shí)際上正在下降。

　　China’s SMEs need cash to keep going – they’ve been frozen out of normal credit channels for months. This method of funding helps spread the credit risks to investors, with a government backstop. So, economically, it is good news. And so long as China’s debt problem looks manageable, there’s no reason to believe that these triple A rated bonds are any different to any others. Investors got their cash back following a “credit event” on a similar bond this year.

　　中國(guó)的中小企業(yè)需要現(xiàn)金才能維持運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，但它們被凍結(jié)在正常信貸渠道之外已有幾個(gè)月了。這種融資方式相當(dāng)于是在政府的支持下，將信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散給投資者。因此，從經(jīng)濟(jì)意義上說(shuō)，這是一個(gè)好消息。只要中國(guó)的債務(wù)問(wèn)題看起來(lái)仍然可控，我們就沒(méi)有理由認(rèn)為這些AAA級(jí)債券與其他AAA級(jí)債券之間存在任何差別。今年，一種類(lèi)似的債券發(fā)生了“信貸事件”，不過(guò)后來(lái)，投資者還是拿回了自己的資金。

　　But – with China’s economy slowing, and its debt problem essentially impossible to quantify – it may still require a strong stomach to invest.

　　但是，隨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，加上其債務(wù)問(wèn)題基本上無(wú)法量化，因此，要想繼續(xù)投資，可能還需要有一顆強(qiáng)大的內(nèi)心。

　　中小企業(yè)融資英文文章篇二

　　中國(guó)中小企業(yè)融資難的出路

　　The Fix for China's Small-Business Cash Crunch

　　Beijing is worried about the country's shadow banking market and the risks it poses to the financial system. The central bank's recent liberalization of regulations on bank lending rates was in part an attempt to address the fact that a large proportion of the economy's financing activity happens in this grey or black market. Yet policy makers will have to go further if they want to address this growing threat to the country's economic stability.

　　中國(guó)政府擔(dān)心中國(guó)的影子銀行市場(chǎng)以及它給金融系統(tǒng)造成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。中國(guó)央行不久前放松對(duì)銀行放貸利率的監(jiān)管在一定程度上是試圖應(yīng)對(duì)一個(gè)事實(shí)，即中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的融資活動(dòng)有很大一部分發(fā)生在這個(gè)灰色或黑色市場(chǎng)。然而，決策者如果想應(yīng)對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定所面對(duì)的這一越來(lái)越大的威脅，則必須更進(jìn)一步。

　　Shadow banking refers to illegal and unregulated lending practices through financing companies, trusts, street-side lenders or the like instead of through banks. This is mainly a phenomenon involving small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for 80% of China's jobs and 60% of its GDP and yet struggle to secure bank loans. A recent study commissioned by the State Council estimates that 62% of China's small and micro businesses have no lending relationships at all with banks.

　　影子銀行業(yè)指的是不通過(guò)銀行，而是通過(guò)融資公司、信托機(jī)構(gòu)、民間貸款商等機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行非法及不受監(jiān)管的放貸活動(dòng)。這種現(xiàn)象主要牽涉到中小企業(yè)，這些企業(yè)為中國(guó)創(chuàng)造了80%的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，并貢獻(xiàn)了60%的GDP，然而卻難以獲得銀行貸款。中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院不久前委托進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)研究估計(jì)，62%的中國(guó)小微企業(yè)與銀行完全沒(méi)有貸款關(guān)系。

　　When small companies can't borrow from banks, they borrow elsewhere, at much higher cost. Beijing understands this, and has tried to boost bank lending to small companies. But officials have not yet been able to overcome many of the incentives that contribute to banks' reluctance to do so. Loans to small businesses tend to be, well, small, and loan officers shy away from making them for the simple reason that it increases their workload. Why bust a gut making 10 loans when you can make one large one, particularly if it is to a state-owned enterprise with implicit government support?

　　當(dāng)小公司無(wú)法從銀行貸款時(shí)，就只能另尋他途，而且要付出高得多的代價(jià)。中國(guó)政府明白這一點(diǎn)，并嘗試增加銀行向小企業(yè)提供的貸款。但官員們迄今一直未能克服促使銀行不愿意向小企業(yè)放貸的眾多因素。向小企業(yè)發(fā)放的貸款規(guī)模往往較小，貸款官員避免發(fā)放這類(lèi)貸款只是出于一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的原因：他們的工作量會(huì)增加。要是你能發(fā)放一筆大額的貸款，干嘛還要費(fèi)勁巴拉地去發(fā)放10筆小額貸款呢，尤其是如果那筆大額貸款是發(fā)放給得到政府暗中支持的國(guó)有企業(yè)的話(huà)。

　　Last month, in an effort to get banks to lower their lending rates and boost lending generally, the central bank removed its floor on lending rates. But the practical effect, if any, will largely be to reduce the borrowing costs of state-owned enterprises. It won't lead to an increase in bank lending to SMEs or reduce their reliance on the shadow banking system, because it doesn't change the basic incentives for banks.

　　上個(gè)月，為了讓銀行降低貸款利率并在整體上增加放貸，中國(guó)央行取消了貸款利率下限。但這一舉措即便產(chǎn)生了實(shí)際效果，也只是降低了國(guó)有企業(yè)的貸款成本。此舉并不會(huì)導(dǎo)致向中小企業(yè)發(fā)放的貸款增加，或是降低中小企業(yè)對(duì)于影子銀行系統(tǒng)的依賴(lài)，因?yàn)樗](méi)有改變影響銀行放貸行為的因素。

　　Authorities were much closer to the mark when, in 2009, they allowed the creation of small loan companies, or SLCs. These are privately funded entities that make quick loans to small businesses as an alternative to traditional bank loans. They are not regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) but they are overseen by provincial financial officials and follow government-approved lending standards.

　　當(dāng)局在2009年時(shí)曾經(jīng)更接近這個(gè)目標(biāo)，當(dāng)時(shí)他們?cè)试S建立小額貸款公司。這些公司是私人注資的實(shí)體，向小企業(yè)發(fā)放快速貸款，作為傳統(tǒng)銀行貸款的替代選擇。這些小貸公司不受中國(guó)銀行業(yè)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)的監(jiān)管，而是由省級(jí)金融官員主管，并遵循政府批準(zhǔn)的放貸標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　These loan companies are proving to be a good funding alternative for SMEs. From my research and discussions with loan-company owners, their loans are collateralized and demand is strong, and as long as they adhere to strict loan to value ratio rules, defaults are rare.

　　這些貸款公司成為很好的中小企業(yè)融資替代選擇。筆者進(jìn)行的研究以及與貸款公司老板的訪(fǎng)談顯示，這些公司的貸款都有抵押，需求很旺，而且只要他們堅(jiān)持嚴(yán)格的貸款與價(jià)值比率規(guī)則，就很少有違約的情況。

　　However, current regulations limit the amounts SLCs can lend. Changes are needed for the program to make a serious dent in the funding shortfall the SME sector faces.

　　然而，目前的監(jiān)管規(guī)定令小額貸款公司的貸款規(guī)模受到限制。要想顯著緩解中小企業(yè)面臨的融資難問(wèn)題，這個(gè)方案還需要進(jìn)行一些調(diào)整。

　　The first problem is that there are not enough small-loan companies. Beijing has ceased issuing new licences, effectively capping the number of SLCs. Since these tend to be smaller firms, the numerical cap also serves as a cap on available credit. This made sense when the program was in its pilot stage. But authorities should now feel confident expanding it.

　　首先，小貸公司的數(shù)量還不夠。中國(guó)政府已停發(fā)新牌照，實(shí)際上就是給小貸公司數(shù)量設(shè)限了。由于這些公司都是規(guī)模較小的公司，數(shù)量上的限制也就意味著貸款規(guī)模的限制。這樣做在試點(diǎn)階段是講得通的。但現(xiàn)在相關(guān)部門(mén)應(yīng)該有擴(kuò)大這個(gè)試點(diǎn)的信心了。

　　Second, restrictions on capital-raising leave small-loan companies without enough cash to meet demand for loans. The lending ceiling is the amount of a loan company's registered capital, plus borrowings from banks of up to 50% of equity. A loan company with equity of million has its lending capped at million, and the only way it can increase this cap is to raise more equity.

　　其次，對(duì)融資規(guī)模的限制規(guī)定令小貸公司沒(méi)有足夠的資金來(lái)滿(mǎn)足貸款需求。小貸公司放貸上限是其注冊(cè)資本加上從銀行獲得的不超過(guò)其股本50%的融資。一家股本為2,000萬(wàn)美元的小貸公司貸款上限就是3,000萬(wàn)美元，而提高這個(gè)上限的唯一辦法就是擴(kuò)大股本。

　　As most SLCs face the same difficulties obtaining loans from banks as other small businesses, they end up lending only the capital put into them by their owners, which is not nearly sufficient to meet demand. Small-loan companies' collective lending is estimated at only 600 billion yuan ( billion) while the CBRC estimates a 2.67 trillion yuan gap between SME demand for loans and the supply. Loan-company owners are reluctant to pour too much capital into their firms because the process of adding equity capital is tied up with red tape, making it hard to make withdrawals later.

　　由于大多數(shù)小貸公司像其他小企業(yè)一樣難以從銀行獲得貸款，因此他們只能用所有者注入的資本來(lái)放貸，這遠(yuǎn)不夠滿(mǎn)足目前的需求。小貸公司總體放貸能力估計(jì)僅有人民幣6,000億元，而銀監(jiān)會(huì)估計(jì)中小企業(yè)貸款缺口為人民幣2.67萬(wàn)億元。小貸公司所有者不愿向其公司注入太多資本，因?yàn)樵黾庸杀镜某绦蚍爆崳院蟪榛刭Y本有相當(dāng)難度。

　　Beijing could allow small loan companies to borrow funds from their shareholders. Regulators have been justifiably cautious about this, since it would open the door to potentially large and rapid flows of capital into and out of loan companies, with destabilizing consequences for the broader industry.

　　中國(guó)政府可以允許小貸公司向股東融資。監(jiān)管部門(mén)在這方面頗為審慎，這是可以理解的，因?yàn)檫@會(huì)打開(kāi)資金大規(guī)?？焖龠M(jìn)出這些貸款公司的大門(mén)，可能導(dǎo)致整個(gè)行業(yè)出現(xiàn)不穩(wěn)定。

　　But the answer to that fear should be carefully tailored regulation, not a stifling of the industry. For instance, Beijing could cap shareholder loans at an amount equal to total invested equity. This would allow small-loan company executives the flexibility to put more capital into their firms via shareholder loans, but keep them from overextending themselves.

　　但要想解決這種擔(dān)憂(yōu)，應(yīng)當(dāng)審慎制定監(jiān)管規(guī)定，而不是扼殺整個(gè)行業(yè)。比如，政府可以將股東提供的融資規(guī)模限制在與其總股本投資規(guī)模相等的水平。這樣既可以讓小貸公司管理層以股東貸款的方式向公司注入更多資本，又能使其不至于過(guò)度擴(kuò)張。

　　The shadow banking issue illustrates the extent of the challenges Beijing will face in reforming the financial system. But these challenges are not insurmountable. In cases such as small-loan companies, Beijing already has the tools it needs. As reform continues, authorities should look for opportunities to expand programs that already are working even as they undertake new liberalizations in other areas.

　　影子銀行問(wèn)題顯示出中國(guó)政府在金融系統(tǒng)改革方面將面臨多大程度的挑戰(zhàn)。但這些挑戰(zhàn)并不是不能克服的。在小貸公司等問(wèn)題上，北京需要的解決工具已經(jīng)有了。隨著改革繼續(xù)深入，相關(guān)部門(mén)在其他領(lǐng)域?qū)嵤┬碌拈_(kāi)放措施的同時(shí)，也應(yīng)當(dāng)尋找擴(kuò)大已經(jīng)開(kāi)始發(fā)揮作用的試點(diǎn)的機(jī)會(huì)。

　　相關(guān)文章拓展閱讀：小企業(yè)的衰落

　　During the recent years, countless small businesses have closed their doors and gone bankrupt. The corner grocer's , the small dress shop, the beauty salon, all are victims of market competition. Most of them are replaced by other small businesses that temporarily fill the needs of the neighbourhood but frequently end up, sharing the same fate of dissolution. More often, the market served by small businesses is taken over by large stores and shops. Businesses like the corner groceries and the dress shops have gone to big department stores and supermarkets, which not only keep adequate store and variety, but also provide better environment and service.

　　Apparently, it is increasingly difficult for small businesses to succeed in the present complex economic structure based, as it is, on small profit margins and tremendous sales volume. Lack of enough fund and poor management may be the chief cause of this tragedy. In addition, the quality of their commodities often causes suspicion of the customers as many small businesses are found to sell fake products for more profit, thus earning themselves an evil reputation. As to shopping environment and convenient service, they are unmentionable. All of the above speed up their bankruptcy.

　　Today, with the establishment of more and more groups and big corporations, how small businesses can survive in the tide of the market competitive economy hasbecome a hot social issue.

　　
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